In a chemistry textbook written and used by a long-time Princeton professor, the author remarks that “the study of science will not lead you to Ultimate Truth.” [1] [1] I withhold the reference here out of respect for the author.

However, throughout the text he refers to nature (with a capital ‘N’) as the starting point of everything. Somehow, the absolute status of nature, which he praises for its creativity and omnipotence, is deified by a methodology that cannot attain absolute truth. The author makes a religious claim about nature that he himself would concede is unsubstantiated by his empirical research or by general work in science, but is still legitimate. Something is wrong here.

Scientists untrained in epistemology, the branch of philosophy that explores what we know and how we know it, are often unprepared to defend the intellectual underpinnings—not only the immense power, but also the strict limits—of the scientific method. Of course, this is understandable; most of us science and engineering students would decry yet another course requirement, this time on the intellectual foundations of our enterprise. This ignorance may not hinder scientists’ daily research; however, it renders some of the people most listened to in the public square unquali.ed to speak about what science cannot say.

The interaction between science and religion has grabbed almost everyone’s attention at some point, and is increasingly contentious in and important to policy and philosophy. Here, I present two recent attempts by prominent scientists to deal with the two fields, show how these fail, and discuss an alternative based on the idea of sphere sovereignty. [2] [2] The issue of the relationship between scientific and metaphysical theories is not new to philosophy of science, where it is known as the demarcation problem. It has roots in Kant and Hume but was mostly developed in the twentieth century by Duhem, Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, Popper, and others. See Part IV of Gillies, Donald. Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993.

Due to space constraints, I only gesture toward arguments in this last section, and I encourage you to examine the sources footnoted for complete discussions. The attempts of scientists to reconcile science and religion range from suggestions of non-interaction to complete synthesis. Perhaps the most recognized current public advocate of non-interaction is Stephen Jay Gould, an evolutionary biologist who proposes what seems at first to be a level-headed attempt to arbitrate between two feuding partners. [3] [3] Gould, SJ. Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life. New York: Ballantine Publishing Group, 1999.

close

He suggests that, by limiting science and religion to their proper spheres—where “science tries to document the factual character of the world [while] religion operates in the equally important, but utterly different realm of human purposes, meanings, and values” [4] [4] Gould, pp. 70-71.

close

—a peaceful coexistence can exist between them. This principle, which he calls non-overlapping magisteria (a Catholic term referring to “teacher”), is a reformulation of Thomas Henry Huxley’s reflections on the Kantian distinction between phenomena, the class of observable things empirically investigated by science, and noumena, the class of essential qualities that underlie these phenomena but are inaccessible to observation. Huxley used this distinction to coin the word agnosticism in 1869, since in his mind phenomena could be studied and known, while noumena, which are traditionally associated with the claims of religion, could not.

While there are many problems with Gould’s peaceable solution to the conflict in religion versus science, two major errors undermine the entire project. First, to use his outmoded categories from 18th century philosophy, if studying phenomena is the only justi.ed goal of science, science has already moved beyond its goal. Through both theory formation in physics and newer fields such as cognitive neuroscience, researchers pursue answers that must be classified as noumena. [5] [5] or, in Kant’s language, outside of the necessary preconditions required for our perceiving objects; see also Heslam, Peter S. Creating a Christian Worldview: Abraham Kuyper’s Lectures on Calvinism. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998. pp. 170-171.

Second, and much more important, in Gould’s formulation, “the role of true religion [is] as a ground for moral contemplation, rather than a set of dogmas accepted without questioning.” [6] [6] Gould, p. 42.

close

Though Gould claims that the magisteria of science and religion are equally powerful, this description of religion precludes absolute morality. He asserts the autonomy and primacy of the individual in determining morality. As a scientist, he violates his own rule of non-interference by impinging on the domain and methodology of religion. He defines the parameters of moral knowledge and denies that they can solve any ultimate questions. This trivialization rules out the possibility of a divinity, who is the ground for moral authority and not mere contemplation, and thus it illegitimates any fundamental religious claim.

A second scientist who has recently addressed the intersection of science and religion is E.O. Wilson, a naturalist and founder of the field of sociobiology. [7] [7] Wilson, Edward O. Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998.

Fortunately, he avoids the central flaw in Gould’s thinking by recognizing that the current claims of naturalistic science and true religion cannot, in fact, peacefully coexist. The modest objective of his book Consilience is to explain everything knowable using only physical matter, synthesizing the fields of physics, biology, culture, the arts, and religion along the way. This popular line of thinking is known as strict materialism, in which abstractions such as social psychology are described wholly by their physical properties or instantiations, such as the subatomic particles that compose the genes underlying these principles.

Wilson applies this conception of the world to the origins of morality. In his mind, because evolution is the means by which all things exist, it also determines the rules governing the interactions of all things, including the moral rules governing ethical interactions: “Ought is just shorthand for one kind of factual statement, a word that denotes what society first chose (or was coerced) to do, and then codified.” [8] [8] Wilson, p. 251.

In opposition to this view is what Wilson calls transcendentalism, which holds that morals are received from the divine directly or from natural law. This latter stance has a rich history in academic philosophy. Kant recognized that the ought—morality, or the way things should be—has no place in the cause-and-effect system of nature. [9] [9] Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 1785.

close

Continuing this reasoning, G.E. Moore noted that moral reasoning should not use observations about the world to determine what is ethically right. [10] [10] Moore, G.E. Principia Ethica. 1903.

close

In other words, fields like psychology and social science, though they give insight into human nature, cannot establish moral principles. He called this logical misstep from the factual is to the normative ought the naturalistic fallacy.

In claiming that the ought and the is are one and the same, Wilson’s solution to, or rather, denial of, this fallacy fails on several fronts. First, it does not solve the question of morality. Society has rarely if ever agreed on an entire moral system to govern human behavior. [11] [11] This must be understood in distinction from societal law, which governs certain civil behavior, but in no way prescribes an entire moral system agreed on by all citizens.

Strangely, this same scientist who desperately avoids anything unprovable holds the most idealized, and never historically substantiated, opinion of human cooperation. Second, our observations of the world are descriptive while morality is prescriptive.  To the strict materialist, nothing in nature need determine human moral  injunctions. In fact, Nietzsche more thoughtfully developed this materialist  conception long before Wilson when he recognized that, if no divinity  provides morality, then accepting some codified and institutionalized ethic is unnecessary, ignorant, and even tragic. [12] [12] Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 1886; On the Genealogy of Morals, 1887; The Antichrist, 1888.

close

In other words, Wilson’s “empirical” morality is futile. Last, Wilson’s apparent conclusion—that society establishes an appropriate morality by evolution and tradition—presupposes the thing he is out to prove. Essentially, he states there is nothing transcendent, uses this statement to affirm an “empirical” approach to morality, then concludes that the success of an empirical explanation of morality nullifies the transcendent one. Ultimately, Wilson offers no reason why we should believe “ought is the product of a material process” [13] [13] Wilson, p. 251.

close

except that this thinking supports his overarching hunch that the whole of metaphysics is determined by the foundation of physics.

If neither of these common-sense attempts to reconcile science with morality or religion pan out, what are we left with? One compelling conception of the relationship between these two fields resonates both with the Wilsonian desire to bring coherence to all things knowable, and with the Gouldian plea to define the contours of different types of knowledge. This view hinges on the recognition that people observe the world according to personal biases and viewpoints—their so-called presuppositions—which determine the way they understand things knowable. An essential presupposition of the naturalistic scientism exhibited in both Gould and Wilson is the firm belief that God does not exist. However, this belief is not proven in the development of either text: Gould rejects the possibility of a divinity as he conflates religion with tradition, and Wilson cannot engage the possibility of a divinity since his central premise is that the smallest bit of matter alone determines all things.

Developing a conception of the relationship between science and religion from a Christian perspective effectively addresses some of the problems inherent in the thinking of both Gould and Wilson. Such a perspective takes as its presupposition the existence of the God of the Bible. While there are many implications of this worldview for personal life and belief, it also has ramifications for society and institutions. In particular, it has prompted Christian scholars to suggest that each social institution is “sovereign in its own sphere,” meaning that an institution can and should exercise authority in the domain of questions with which it is concerned, but must also cede ultimate authority to God, who is sovereign over all things. [14] [14] This is a theory based on the thought of Dutch Prime Minister and Reformed thinker Abraham Kuyper; for a concise introduction, see Heslam, chs. 1-3. In this article ‘Reformed’ refers to the Christian tradition built upon the theology of John Calvin.

For example, the family and the state are both institutions that, although affecting one another, are governed by their own set of principles—love and responsibility in one, rights and justice in the other.

Science is another “sphere,” governed by principles such as Baconian inductive reasoning, encouraged to function according to these institutional principles that allowed its development since the Enlightenment, and ultimately executed under the authority of the sovereign God. Many features of the sphere sovereignty of science within a Christian worldview have been well developed. [15] [15] especially with regard to the relationship between empirical observation and theory making; see Dooyeweerd, Herman. A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, 1953-8.

Though the subtleties of this scholarship are great, I briefly address two features below.

First, there is a Christian responsibility in science. Because of the overarching conviction that Christ’s redemption applies not merely to the personal believer on an eternal timescale, but to the entire universe on a temporal one, [16] [16] Kuyper called this idea of cosmic redemption Calvinism’s dominating principle. It is helpful in understanding the extent of God’s grace to humankind and their world.

temporal life is an essential component of the Christian life; Christians are not merely waiting to get to heaven. Understanding the world as a “visible curtain behind which the exalted workings of divine thought shines forth,” [17] [17] Kuyper, De Gemeene Gratie,p. 5; as quoted in Heslam, p. 174.

close

Reformed Christianity sees the study of science as an essential part of this temporal life, and thus recognizes both the pleasure and the accountability of empirical research and the formation of theories. [18] [18] I cannot here address criticisms of this claim, though I acknowledge that parts of history do not substantiate it. Briefly, I submit that the Catholic church of the middle ages did not separate the church and science spheres, so that the church legislated on truth and error regarding issues outside of its sphere. Today, certain sects of fundamentalism disregard the local sovereignty of the sphere of science by combating it with ill-conceived pseudoscience that undermines both the scientific enterprise and the Christianity they represent.

close

Second, there is a Christian liberty in science. Under the framework of strict materialism, agnostic researchers must grapple with the desire to transcend the empirical and yet to describe all things according to the physical exclusively. Their approach a priori prohibits their considering the non-physical, whether or not it exists. Meanwhile, the Christian researcher can strive with likeminded tenacity at an empirical understanding, but need not be concerned that the conclusions of such work would undermine the overarching Christian worldview. Anything learned is for God’s glory and from His mind, and only supplements an understanding of the sphere of science, over which God is still sovereign. This turns on its head the typical notion that atheists are unfettered while Christians are chained to their dogma.

I have identified some of the ways in which typical conceptions of science fail, either because they ignore the tendency of science to extend its reign beyond its scope (Gould), or they deny the presuppositions on which they rely (Wilson). Such epistemological negligence is not exclusively, or even primarily, an academic problem. For example, two weeks ago, the National Academy of Sciences, whose Congress-supported mandate includes advising the government on scientific matters, [19] [19] http://www.nationalacademies.org

published ethical guidelines for human stem cell research. The implications of an accurate philosophy of science, a Christian version of which is only roughly sketched above, are far-reaching, extending not only to the determination of human value, but also to debates on the nature of evolution, the mind-body problem, and education policy.

[1] I withhold the reference here out of respect for the author.

[2] The issue of the relationship between scientific and metaphysical theories is not new to philosophy of science, where it is known as the demarcation problem. It has roots in Kant and Hume but was mostly developed in the twentieth century by Duhem, Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, Popper, and others. See Part IV of Gillies, Donald. Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993.

[3] Gould, SJ. Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life. New York: Ballantine Publishing Group, 1999.

[4] Gould, pp. 70-71.

[5] or, in Kant’s language, outside of the necessary preconditions required for our perceiving objects; see also Heslam, Peter S. Creating a Christian Worldview: Abraham Kuyper’s Lectures on Calvinism. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998. pp. 170-171.

[6] Gould, p. 42.

[7] Wilson, Edward O. Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998.

[8] Wilson, p. 251.

[9] Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 1785.

[10] Moore, G.E. Principia Ethica. 1903.

[11] This must be understood in distinction from societal law, which governs certain civil behavior, but in no way prescribes an entire moral system agreed on by all citizens.

[12] Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 1886; On the Genealogy of Morals, 1887; The Antichrist, 1888.

[13] Wilson, p. 251.

[14] This is a theory based on the thought of Dutch Prime Minister and Reformed thinker Abraham Kuyper; for a concise introduction, see Heslam, chs. 1-3. In this article ‘Reformed’ refers to the Christian tradition built upon the theology of John Calvin.

[15] especially with regard to the relationship between empirical observation and theory making; see Dooyeweerd, Herman. A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, 1953-8.

[16] Kuyper called this idea of cosmic redemption Calvinism’s dominating principle. It is helpful in understanding the extent of God’s grace to humankind and their world.

[17] Kuyper, De Gemeene Gratie,p. 5; as quoted in Heslam, p. 174.

[18] I cannot here address criticisms of this claim, though I acknowledge that parts of history do not substantiate it. Briefly, I submit that the Catholic church of the middle ages did not separate the church and science spheres, so that the church legislated on truth and error regarding issues outside of its sphere. Today, certain sects of fundamentalism disregard the local sovereignty of the sphere of science by combating it with ill-conceived pseudoscience that undermines both the scientific enterprise and the Christianity they represent.

[19] http://www.nationalacademies.org

David Matthews ’05 is a Princeton senior majoring in molecular biology; this fall he will be pursuing a Ph.D. in Computational Neurobiology at the Salk Institute and UC San Diego.